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Introduction
In 1991, Scotland paid 50.75 million pounds for Motorola to locate a mobile-phone factory employing 3,000 people. In the late 1980s, Toyota was offered an incentive package worth 125--147 million dollars in present value for a plant expected to employ 3,000 workers (Haskel et al., 2001 ). Ireland encourages FDI by introduction of National Development Plan that increases the value and sustainability of foreign companies, and secures their future. The technology transfer effect appears when domestic firms receive new technologies and know-how for lower costs from MNCs. The catch-up effect simply means that foreign firm captures the share of local market or domestic firm looses its market share.
At the same time, the latter effect may have positive influence on local firms. In this case, 3 Department of Enterprise Trade and Employment, 10 January, 2000, http://www.entemp.ie/press00/100100a.htm it is called competition effect. Competition effect arises when entrance of foreign firms forces domestic firms to act more efficiently in order to protect their profits and shares.
The foreign linkage effect appears when foreign companies use services supplied by local firms. Demonstration effect appears when a home firm, observing the behaviour of foreign company, tries to mimic it. Finally, the training effect is a situation when foreign firms provide training for their workers and managers, who in future can be hired by domestic firms.
Attracting Foreign Direct Investment has already become one of the most essential issues in the transformation and development of the Ukrainian economy. Blomstrom and Kokko (1997) view demonstration effect as an important channel of spillovers. It arises when domestic firms try to mimic foreign firms in different areas of business activity. They suggest, that demonstration is often related to the competition effect and takes place uncousciously. Kinoshita (1998) determines the demonstrationimitation effect: when domestic firms observe activity of their multinational competitors they start to imitate or copy in order to become more productive.
In our research we want to investigate the direct and indirect effects of FDI. Indirect effect are spread through regional and industrial spillovers that correspond to backward linkage and competition spillover channels respectively.
We anticipate to find positive linkage effect while competition effect can be both positive and negative.
Direct and Indirect FDI Effects

Data description
The data used in this research consist of two EERC Research Center datasets. The first includes micro-level information on fixed assets, labor force, sales, export, import, barter operations, and industry-region information. The second contains information on FDI presence in certain firms.
Alternative estimations of fixed assets are used in the literature. Following Ponomareva (2000), our study uses the balance sheet value of fixed assets as proxy for capital, since this is the best available measure of real capital capacities of the firm. All data are at constant 1998 prices, converted using the producer price index from the UEPLAC (2000) web site 6 (See Table 1 ).
Our data contains 292 observations of manufacturing firms for the years 1998 and 1999.
25 per cent of these firms have received FDI. A firm is assumed to be a recipient of FDI if:
· The firm is under foreign ownership; or · The firm reported a change in the level of FDI received during last period.
The data set covers four regions: Lviv, Kyiv, Odesa and Kharkiv. These regions represent West, Center, South and East of Ukraine, respectively. The regional distribution with frequencies and percentages is described in Table 2 . As can be seen from the Table 2 , the share of Kyiv, Lviv and Kharkiv regions is 30% each, while the share of Odesa region is 10%. This may be explained by the fact that the Ukrainian South is less industrialized than the central or eastern areas. The data set covers seven industries. Most of the firms are involved in food industry (25 per cent) or in metal processing (20 per cent). However, a large number of firms do not identify themselves as belonging to any particular industry (22 per cent). The industry distribution of firms is summarized in Table 3 . The ownership structure of available data is depicted in Table 4 . A significant share of firms (36%) did not report their form of ownership. Workers own 17% of firms in the sample. Other physical entities are either retired persons or those who bought shares during certificate auctions.
The Econometric Models Employed
The main aim of this paper is to estimate the influence of FDI on firms' performance and to identify region-industry spillover effects.
In order to estimate the former effect, we develop the following analytical model:
where i -index for firm, and t -index for year;
P it -firm performance, estimated as labor productivity or export volume; L it -labor, i.e. the number of workers in the firm;
K it -capital stock or the balance value of fixed assets;
Scale it -proxy for economies of scale, estimated as the ratio of a firm's production to the average production in the industry; The econometric specifications selected are shown below.
Model 1.
Labor productivity is assumed to be a performance indicator and our model is: For the regional dummies, the Odesa region is the base, and R 1 denotes Kyiv, R 2 -Lviv, and R 3 -Kharkiv. The unspecified industry category is the base for the industry dummies, and the other dummies are: S 1 -metallurgy, S 2 -metal processing, S 3 -wood and paper, S 4 -construction materials, S 5 -light industry and S 6 -food industry. (H1 1 : α 2 >0: FDI has a significant influence on labor productivity )
As is customary, we anticipate the rejection of our null hypothesis.
Model 2.
Here, performance is measured by export volume. If a firm exports more, this may be interpreted as a sign of comparative advantage. This model has basically the same structure as model 1, but a proxy for economies of scale, estimated as the ratio of firm's production to the average production in industry, was added. Furthermore, separate variables for capital and labor were used instead of the labor productivity variable. Both models presented above may be affected by endogeneity. A priori, we might expect that firms receiving FDI will have higher labor productivity as a result, and firms with higher labor productivity attract more FDI. The same links can be traced between FDI and export. FDI results in many cases in higher export volumes, and conversely, large export volumes attract FDI.
To correct for this endogeneity problem, we applied the following two-stage methodology.
While FDI is highly correlated with exports, the latter, in turn, is not closely correlated 9 with labor productivity. Therefore, as a first step, we constructed the following measure: and as a second step, using GLS in order to avoid heteroscedasticity, we estimated: Thus, we estimated the real effect of FDI on labor productivity. Similarly, estimations were performed with exports as indicator of firm performance: We anticipate that FDI has a positive effect on firm's performance estimated as labor productivity or export.
In models 3-4, we investigate whether a firm that does not directly receive FDI benefits indirectly from FDI in other firms in its industry-region. In other words, we want to estimate the influence of FDI intensity, which is represented as a share of investment in a certain region-industry, on performance of firms that do not themselves receive FDI.
When estimating these indirect effects, there is less potential for endogeneity 11 , as we do not expect the productivity of firms that do not receive any FDI to be affected by the proportion of FDI in other firms in their industry-region. It is not likely that FDI in the industry-region should somehow be correlated with the labor productivity of firms that do not get any FDI. To control for unobserved heteroscedasticity we again use GLS for these three models.
Model 3. Using labor productivity as a measure of firm performance, our model becomes: 
Regional dummies have been dropped in this specification, because their coefficients turned out to be insignificant. The spillover variable is defined as the percentage of FDI in 11 We thank Inessa Love from Columbia University for clarifying this point. We anticipate that FDI received by firms in a particular region and industry has a positive, possibly small effect on the performance of other firms in the same region and industry.
Again, performance is measured by labor productivity and alternatively by exports.
In order to test all four hypotheses, we estimated and tested all four models. Our impact on the labor productivity of the receiving firm. Consequently, we reject our null hypothesis H1 0 . Regional dummies are not significant, suggesting that there are no significant differences in the effects of FDI among the Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa and Lviv regions. As for differences between industries, labor productivity turns out to be relatively low in metal processing (S 2 ), the construction materials industry (S 4 ), and the light industry (S 5 ), but relatively high in the food industry (S 6 ). Among ownership dummies, only the foreign-ownership dummy is significant and has a positive impact. Foreign-owned firms have higher labor productivity. So, we could suggest that our zero hypothesis is rejected statistically.
Model 2. Effects of FDI on exports
In order to test our second hypothesis, we estimated the model from equation 7. Again, we show one representative specification below, and present more complete results in table 6 in the appendices. The FDI dummy is significant and positive, which suggests that H2 0 is econometrically incorrect. Expansion in the export volume depends on labor.
Regional variables are again not significant, which suggests the absence of regional With respect to ownership effects, we note that only two of our dummy variables are significant; these are the state (O 3 ) and foreign ownership (O 6 ) dummies. Export orientation of foreign owners can be explained by the fact that production in Ukraine is less expensive than in some other countries due to inexpensive, high-skilled labor and tax privileges. The significance of state ownership could be a result of direct and implicit government subsidies. Implicit subsidies typically take the form of lower prices for gas, electricity and utilities, which are all either still owned or subsidized by the government.
Model 3. Spillover effects on labor productivity
This model, as well as the next and last one, tests for spillover effects of FDI given to firms in a specific industry and region on other firms' performance in that same industry and region . Using unpublished micro-level annual data for 292 firms for the years 1998-99, we tested for statistical significance of FDI impacts on labor productivity (model 1) and export volume (model 2). Furthermore, we investigated spillover effect in models 3-4.
The results reported in the paper imply that the presence of FDI has a positive influence on both labor productivity and exports. The four regions investigated, i.e. Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa and Lviv, did not exhibit significant differences. In addition, we found small, positive spillover effects on both labor productivity and export volumes of firms that did not themselves receive FDI.
Our results also imply some differences across industries. According to model 1, firms from metal processing, construction materials and light industry exhibit relatively low balor productivity, while enterprises in the food industry enjoy a relatively high labor productivity. We can suggest from model 2, that light industry companies export more then firms from other industries. According to Model 3, firms not receiving FDI in the metal processing and wood industries have lower labor productivity than others industries.
At the same time, the metallurgy industry enjoys relatively high positive externalities.
Either foreign ownership or state-ownership present advantages for both labor productivity and export volumes, according to our results from models 1 and 2. A greater export orientation of foreign owners may be the result of several factors giving the foreign owner advantages in exports markets. The significance of state ownership with respect to labor productivity could be a result of Ukrainian government subsidies, tax privileges and similar policies. According to Model 3 results, firms not receiving FDI and owned by other Ukrainian companies perform worse than other firms with other ownership types.
While some empirical work on FDI has been done for several other transition countries, this is not the case yet for Ukraine. One might assume, that main reasons are problems related to data availability. Similar problems have constrained this research to a data set of less than 300 firms as well as only qualitative data on FDI. Consequently, we plan to work with larger data sets and more complete information on FDI volumes in the future.
It would also be informative to estimate the effects of industry and regional spillovers separately. Finally, we would want to explore the effects of FDI on alternative indicators of firm's performance, such as value added and value added per worker. In parentheses are standard errors; *, **, *** mean 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively. In parentheses are standard errors; *, **, *** mean 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively. In parentheses are standard errors; *, **, *** mean 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively. 
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